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8 April 1966

UNITED STATES TREATMENT OF THE SUBCONTINENT AND THE INDO-PAKISTAN DISPUTE

By

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United States Foreign Service



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United States Treatment of the Subcontinent
and the Indo-Pakistan Dispute

by

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8 April 1966

NOTE

The author has been directly involved with South Asian and Middle Eastern affairs since 1952 and has served in this area for extended periods of time. Many of the thoughts and conclusions in this paper result from direct experience, distilled from many conversations, observations, and from having to deal in practical ways with a number of the problems discussed. Some of the highlights of this experience are as follows:

- 1952-1954: Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D. C.
- 1954: Survey mission to India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Afghanistan.
- 1955-1957: 1st Secretary and Chief of Political Section, American Embassy, Colombo, Ceylon.
- 1962-1964: Deputy Director, Near East, South Asia, North Africa Regional Office, Peace Corps, Washington, D. C.
- 1964-1965: Director, Peace Corps, Pakistan.

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SUMMARY

America today finds itself at a crossroad in South Asia. Both India and Pakistan are faced with internal and external problems of great dimensions. While a truce was reached between them in September 1965 due to U.N. efforts and the agreement in Tashkent, it may well be only temporary and, while tension has eased, the deep-seated enmity between them continues to exist. Further warfare would offer further opportunities for Communist encroachment--from both Red China and the U.S.S.R.

While India welcomed aid from the West at the time of the Chinese invasion from Tibet, she continues a policy of neutrality and a special relationship exists with the Soviet Union. Her domestic situation is rapidly becoming critical, with famine imminent, an internal Communist threat, a stagnant agricultural program, and many critical divisions among her peoples.

Pakistan has become almost a partner of Communist China, while growing further away from the West and particularly the U.S. over the past four years. At the same time, she also has critical domestic troubles, particularly in East Bengal, although her economy is relatively sound.

In these circumstances, the United States finds itself with no preemptive position in an area of the world which is of major importance to it, holding a quarter of the earth's population and the strategic gates to the southeast and the Middle East as far as the Mediterranean Sea.

New directions in military, economic, and political policy must therefore be tried and this thesis attempts to outline suggested courses.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: THE ROOTS OF DISCORD

PARTITION AND VIOLENCE--1947

The virtue of tolerance is found in small quantity in any society, and in the vast, poverty-ridden, and desperately overcrowded subcontinent of Asia, it is indeed rarely seen. In the space of a few short months in 1947, at least 150,000 Hindus and Moslems died violently at each others' hands, over 300,000 more died of disease and starvation caused by the agonizing dislocation of communal war, 6½ million Hindus fled as refugees from East and West Pakistan to India, and 4½ million Moslems from India into the two wings of Pakistan.¹

It is impossible to visualize over the course of history more intensity of misery, hatred, and bloodshed than resulted from the partition of India. Sir Francis Tuber, an eyewitness, in While Memory Serves, writes of a riot at the Calcutta Fair Grounds:

Practically every [Moslem] man, woman, and child was murdered with appalling cruelty. Either here or later even pregnant women were ripped up, their unborn babies torn out, and the infants' brains bashed out on walls and on the ground.²

¹Richard V. Weekes, Pakistan: Birth and Growth of a Muslim Nation, p. 92.

²Sir Francis Tuber, While Memory Serves, p. 198.

MOSLEM-HINDU SEPARATISM

Even without the Kashmir dispute, the religious--the communal--problem between the two countries would suffice to make South Asia a continuing threat to peace. For untold millions, being Moslem or Hindu is all that makes men Pakistanis or Indians.

But Kashmir must be added, together with the 10 million Hindus remaining in Pakistan, the 45 million Moslems still in India, the canal waters problem, the continuing border troubles in Bengal, the Punjab, the Sind, and the irritation caused in New Delhi by Islamabad's close relations with Peking. Tension is always present and violence only hours and sometimes only minutes away from such incidents as the theft of a religious relic from a Kashmir mosque. Yet Nehru wrote:

The real conflict had nothing to do with religion, though religion often masked the issue, but was essentially between those who stood for nationalist, democratic, socially revolutionary policy and those who were concerned with preserving the relics of a feudal regime.³

Here he was speaking of the Moslem separatist movement and it is important to identify its origins and Nehru's own motivations and emotions, for they are essential to an understanding of today's problem.

Moslem contempt for the Hindu in India can be traced as far back as 1200 when the Moghul invaders' capital was

³Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 399.

established at New Delhi. It is based largely on disdain for the caste system and occasional Hindu attempts to reach an accommodation with Islam, which in turn would permit no compromise. With the Battle of Plassey in 1757 and a British victory, not only did the French lose, but slightly more indirectly so did the ruling Moslems. It permitted the English to extend their control over the subcontinent and led to their favoring Hindu over Moslem, particularly after the mutiny exactly 100 years later, for which the British held the Moslems primarily responsible.⁴

In a sense, Moslem separatism can be said to begin with the Indian Mutiny of 1857, for as a result of British favoritism, the Moslems withdrew from participation in the community life of the subcontinent. In 1931, a Moslem student named Rahmat Ali invented the word Pakistan, Farsi for "Pure Land."⁵ A year before, the great Urdu poet, Mohammed Iqbal, at a meeting of the Moslem League at Allahabad had first raised the standard of independence, proposing a northwest Moslem state.⁶ The League, founded at Dacca in 1906 among other things "To promote the feeling

⁴This bias was reinforced as late as 1930 when the Pathans, led by Khan Abdul Ghafter Khan, carried out a civil disobedience movement in the Northwest Frontier Province during which the British jailed more than 10,000 people.

⁵"P" for Punjab, "A" for the Afghan area, "K" for Kashmir, "S" for Sind, "TAN" for Baluchistan. Bengal is noticeably absent.

⁶Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security, pp. 1-2.

of loyalty to the British," increasingly over the years had become hardened in its objectives and attitudes, reflecting particularly an increased feeling of isolation on the part of the Moslems from the other South Asian communities.

Concurrently, the Indian National Congress, formed in 1885 and largely Hindu, also became militant in its drive toward independence for India. It at least gave lip service to an open door policy as far as Moslem membership was concerned, but in ever larger numbers the politically-conscious Moslems shied away from the Congress, as they considered it first and foremost a vehicle to promote Hindu interests.

The effects of the split were recognized early by the British rulers. In the Montague-Chelmsford Report on Indian Constitutional Reform issued in 1918, it was stated that "Division by creeds and classes means the creation of political camps organized against each other and teaches men to think as partisans and not as citizens." Yet the British themselves continued to widen the gap by such means as employing Hindus and not Moslems in the Indian Civil Service, by not providing equivalent educational facilities, by encouraging Moslems to stay away from the National Congress, and by setting up separate Moslem electorates. (The Moslems also had such separate organizations as trade unions, student groups, and merchants' clubs.)

It was somewhat true, as Nehru charged,⁷ that the Moslem community was held back through lack of development and the retention of a feudal order by its leadership, but neither the British nor the Hindu community encouraged unity. It was not in the interests of either group. The British feared the effects of a politically united India and the Hindu leaders had no desire to share their leadership with Moslems.

The effect of this isolation of Islam was well reflected in the 1939 report of the Moslem League's Working Committee: "Moslems are irrevocably opposed to any federal objective, which must necessarily result in a majority community rule under the guise of democracy and a parliamentary system of government."

The League was held back from a complete break in the 1930's only by the brilliant, cold, aloof lawyer and Moslem leader, Mohammed Ali Jinnah,⁸ who thought until 1940 that both communities could and should work together. Only then at a conference at Lahore did he endorse the concept of a separate Islamic nation, put forward in the famous Pakistan Resolution adopted on March 23.⁹

⁷Nehru, op. cit., p. 354.

⁸Referred to often as Quaid-i Azam, the Great Leader.

⁹"Resolved: That it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Moslem League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to Moslems unless it is designed on the following basic principles, namely, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Moslems are numerically in a majority, as in the Northwestern and Eastern Zones of India, should be grouped to constitute 'independent states' in which the Constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."

The abiding hate was there. Between the two World Wars, the League was charging the Congress Party with atrocities and the cry "Islam in danger" was heard daily.

KASHMIR

In the meantime, the second largest of the princely states sat perched like a jewel, albeit a little tarnished, on the crown of India. Sold by the British East India Company to a Hindu in 1846 for the equivalent of a million and a half dollars, it had a special meaning for Nehru, whose family was Kashmiri and Brahmin.¹⁰ In 1940 he wrote: "Like some supremely beautiful woman, whose beauty is almost impersonal and above human desire, such was Kashmir in all its feminine beauty of river and valley and lake and graceful trees." Despite the fact that 77% of its four million people were Moslem, Jawaharlal Nehru was not to let Kashmir go.

In essence then, in South Asia the Hindus were looking from within to the independence of an already-defined state, while the Moslems were looking in from the outside, more and more aware of their alien heritage in Arabia and the plains of Asia to the north, wanting to relive past greatness as the rulers of the Moghul Empire. Many looked to Kemal Ataturk's Turkey with envy or admiration in the

¹⁰Frank Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru, p. 15.

1920's and 1930's as the only remaining great Moslem power, although they decried the secularism of the modern Turkish nation.

SEPARATION AND THE BRITISH

Prior to World War II, the British had been following a line of what they held to be reasonable compromise. The principle of dominion status¹¹ was reaffirmed during the war, but there was always a stopper to Indian National Congress acceptance. Sir Stafford Cripps, then Leader of the House of Commons, formed a mission to India in early 1942 and later proposed an Indian Union, dominion status, and the right of the various states to secede from the British Commonwealth. These proposals were rejected both by the Congress Party and the Moslem League, the latter demanding that the mission favor partition.

Four years later, in February 1946, Sir Stafford went to India again (he was then President of the Board of Trade) with two other Cabinet Ministers.¹² This mission opposed the concept of a separate Moslem state on the basis

Of weighty administrative, economic, and military considerations . . . The two sections of the suggested Pakistan contain the two most

¹¹Siddiqi, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

¹²Lord Pethick Lawrence, Secretary of State, and Mr. A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty.

vulnerable frontiers in India and for a successful defense in depth, the area of Pakistan would be insufficient.¹³

The British, however, were under too many guns. The ravages and economic chaos resulting from the war, the pressures from political entities in Africa, the Far East, as well as from South Asia, for freedom, and the representations made before he died by President Roosevelt specifically on behalf of Indian independence,¹⁴ together with the weakness and enervation caused by the total military drain, all made it impossible for the United Kingdom to hang on.

INDEPENDENCE

Lord Mountbatten, whose handsome profile (accompanied by a handsome wife) was to officiate over the setting of the British sun in Burma and Ceylon also, brought a British proposal to India in 1947, that it intended a transfer of power to "responsible Indian hands" by June of 1948, a proposal calling for a partition along federal lines with separate legislatures. Nehru threw it out on grounds that it would Balkanize the subcontinent, create civil conflict, lead to a breakdown of civil authority, and a demoralization of both the civilian and military government services.

¹³Announcement made on May 16, 1946.

¹⁴Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, p. 55.

The British then modified their proposal to accommodate complete partition; Mountbatten announced the plan in London on June 4, 1947; the House of Commons passed the India Independence bill on June 15; and on August 15 the subcontinent divided into two separate and sovereign nations.

Most of the more ominous predictions rapidly became fact.

CHAPTER 2

INTERLUDE: KASHMIR AND WATER

The intensity of hatred between India and Pakistan must be recognized to understand the relations between them and there are contributing complexities other than those already dwelt upon.

THE INDUS BASIN

The life of western India and West Pakistan depends on a continuing supply of water; both are reliant for their survival on agriculture; and the arteries are five rivers: the Indus, the Chenab, the Ravi, the Sutlej, and the Jhelum. The headwaters of all either arise in India or Indian-held territory or flow through it. Their crops' success every year depends to a considerable degree on an intricate canal system carrying the rivers' waters to the fields. To Pakistan this is more important than to India in terms of acreage. Seventy-five million acres are estimated to be dependent on this supply in West Pakistan and $7\frac{1}{2}$ million acres in the Punjab of India.

AGREEMENT

On April 1, 1948, India cut off the supply of water running through the canals from India into Pakistan. Immediately another war threatened to be as devastating

as that of 1947. Despite reluctance on the part of those in power in New Delhi and Karachi, the United States and Great Britain were able to bring the two countries together.¹ David Lilienthal, then of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, was instrumental in this effort, which was based on the theory that the water dispute must be solved if the other issues were to be solved also. His proposals were primarily economic in nature and by their first tacit acceptance led dramatically to a lessening of tension. But it was not until September 19, 1960, that an agreement was finally signed regulating the use of the waters of the Indus Basin.

Despite this agreement, while currently not a major factor contributing to Indo-Pakistan tensions, to the Pakistanis because of their vulnerability and utter dependence on these waters, the issue remains a constant source of anxiety and latent source of conflict. In this situation, as with others, India holds the top cards.

While India could starve West Pakistan out if she so desired by denying her this water supply, the problem of the non-viable state of Kashmir is politically and emotionally much more important to Pakistan (particularly to the West Pakistanis) than is that of the Indus Basin.

¹Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security, p. 147.

KASHMIR

Kashmir has been essentially a simpler problem. In 1946, sensing the heady scent of independence, the Lion of Kashmir, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, began a "Quit Kashmir" campaign against its Hindu Maharajah, Sir Hari Singh Bahadur, "an autocrat who combined indolence with vast incompetence."²

The waters of the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab flow through Kashmir. The state itself--84,500 square miles of it--has an ill-defined 900 mile border with Communist China. It touches also on the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. All of its geography, therefore, combines to give it important international political significance beyond the confines of South Asia. More germane to the history of this area, however, has been the infection it has represented with no apparent cure for the past 20 years in Indo-Pakistan relations. Not surprisingly, it has largely been individuals who have aggravated the trouble: Nehru, a succession of Pakistani Presidents, and men with special interests such as Sheikh Abdullah.

As the Lion of Kashmir continued his agitation, he was constantly being thrown into jail, and was working at cross purposes with the Maharajah. Kashmir, as one of the princely states, given its theoretical choice of choosing independence from both of the two newly-formed

²Frank Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru, p. 383.

nations, elected not to abandon its newly-found sovereignty. (Even Nehru was seized and held for a short time when he tried to visit Kashmir shortly before independence against the will of Bahadur.) Nonetheless, the shock waves of violence soon reached it in the form of Moslem tribesmen from West Pakistan, who helped intensify an already-formed revolt. Faced with the prospect of losing everything, the Maharajah was forced in October 1947 to plead with India for help as massacres, looting, and rape presaged the complete breakdown of authority.³

On October 24, he finally offered the accession of Kashmir to India. After two days of administrative wrangling over details, a battalion of a Sikh regiment was flown from Delhi to Srinigar and the first Kashmir war began.

Following a series of exchanges of emotional accusations disguised in legalisms between India and Pakistan, India suddenly on December 30 referred the problem to the United Nations Security Council, which in various resolutions in 1948 and 1949 called first for a cease-fire to be followed by the demarcation of a cease-fire line, second for a truce agreement providing for the withdrawal of both Indian and Pakistani troops, and third for a plebiscite under the supervision and control of a plebiscite administrator. This last provision furnished the real rub.

³In the town of Baramula, for example, 3000 inhabitants survived out of a population of 14,000.

AGREEMENT

A cease-fire did become effective, to a degree, on January 1, 1949; the cease-fire line was demarcated on July 27, 1949; but never, once the United Nations had the issue before it, would the Indians agree to a plebiscite. Further, once the United States began giving arms to Pakistan in the early 1950's, India would not thereafter agree to demilitarization along the cease-fire line.

As a consequence, Pakistan was left with 5000 square miles of Azad (Free) Kashmir, the Indians retained the treasured Vale, and additional de facto control over what was left, by far the lion's share.

We can recall the many uneasy years since, the presence of a United Nations supervisory team, the endless violations of the border, the continuing threat of all-out war, and the constant accusations against each other by both sides. Then, in late August of 1965, history repeated itself as Pakistani infiltrators moved over many of the same routes as their predecessors had done 18 years before and the second war over Kashmir began.

Once more the United Nations was successful in establishing a cease-fire agreement, but more important was the January 10, 1966, Indian-Pakistani Declaration of Tashkent, signed only hours before Prime Minister Shastri dropped dead of a heart attack. It had two major purposes.

The first was to establish a military situation, through troop withdrawal, which would reduce the likelihood of incidents leading again to major fighting. The second was to normalize relations between India and Pakistan by such means as providing to renew the exchange of High Commissioners, to eliminate hostile propaganda, and to restore trade and other types of peaceful intercourse.⁴

While we may hope for a lasting peace in South Asia, there are unfortunately as many forces which can pull this agreement apart as there are to keep it welded together. Internal politics in Pakistan have already caused Miss Jinnah, sister of Pakistan's first head of state, to denounce President Ayub Khan for selling his country down the river. Nationalists in both countries are unhappy with the settlement. The deep-seated hatred and distrust between Hindu and Moslem are not to be wiped away by a thousand word communique. And for both nations the prize is too valuable politically and psychologically to be abandoned.

For better or for worse, however, events, pressures, and opinions from without the subcontinent will in the long run be the chief determinants of the future relations between India and Pakistan.

⁴New York Times, Jan. 11, 1966, p. 15.


CHAPTER 3

LOOKING OUTWARD AND INWARD--INDIA

PROBLEMS WITHIN

While the India problem continues to be Pakistan's major obsession, India itself has many others of large dimensions. Internally, there is every likelihood of a serious famine in the next few months with the probability of accompanying riots. Her agricultural program is stagnant. Today she absorbs 20 per cent of American grain production. If the birth rate is not controlled and food grown in increasingly greater quantities, she will have three quarters of a billion people to feed by 1990 and it would then require 50 per cent of American grain production at present rates to keep them alive. Her influence in foreign affairs has diminished and no longer can she claim, if indeed she ever truly could, to be the spokesman for the Afro-Asian world. She is a divided country of 25 political units whose 480 million people speak 845 different languages and dialects. These many divisions, plus the internal Communist threat, add to her woes. (Most immediately ominous, however, may be the Red Chinese, who stand on her northern border with 120,000 men in Tibet.¹)

¹Alastair Buchan, The World Today, May 1965.



India must take stronger measures to produce more food; she must institute an effective birth control program; and she must be constantly alert to the possibilities of reconciling the many differences between her peoples, particularly if she is to face the world with a foreign policy of any significance and influence. Similarly, she cannot continue effectively to speak to the world with two voices. She cannot seize Goa and then denounce the imperialism of the West; she cannot hate the Chinese in the north and ostensibly sympathize with them in southeast Asia. Responsibility and consistency in attitude toward foreign affairs and problems have not characterized the newly independent nations and India is very far from being an exception.

It is worthwhile examining this dichotomy and its origins, which are two: first, what Nehru called "the other worldliness" of India² resulting from early Buddhist influence and its concern with non-violence, and, second, the isolation which the English brought to India during the days of their power. They controlled the seaways and in the interests of national security closed the landways: the frontiers of Baluchistan, Afghanistan, and Burma.³ At the same time, directly after independence came, India

²Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 169.

³E. J. Repson, Cambridge History of India, Vol. 1, p. 52.

was thrown, first violently, into the international arena and by virtue of Nehru and his personality began to play a role in foreign affairs disproportionate to her real strength.

Perhaps in partial recognition of weakness, but more importantly in the desire to become the acknowledged leader among the Afro-Asian countries and to represent a policy appealing to them, nonalignment was a natural course to expouse, especially in light of Indian colonial history, and it quickly became a cornerstone of that policy. It was not until the Chinese crossed the border in 1962 that she was moved to realize the value of strong friends in the West.

CHINA

Formal Chinese relations with India go back to 64 A.D. when the Chinese sent an embassy to India.⁴ In 1944, while in a prison at Ahmednagar, Nehru wrote how "Japanese aggression in China had moved India deeply and revived the age-old friendship for China."⁵ But when China invaded Tibet in 1950, many Indians were highly concerned over the territorial security of their country. Two years later Indo-Chinese relations were more directly affected by the Chinese insulting rejection of the Indian U.N.

⁴Nehru, op. cit., p. 128.

⁵Ibid., p. 6.

SEPTEMBER 1959



resolution on the exchange of prisoners in the Korean War. In this instance, the Indians chose to ignore the insult and to continue to play the part of a friend. This role became impossible 10 years later when the Chinese moved south across her boundary.

Significant to this relationship has been the concept of developmental rivalry between the two giants of Asia. American officials, among others, are drawn to pitting openly "the world's largest democracy" against the world's most populous Communist state in the race for economic ascendancy on the continent of Asia, as the test of the inherent strength of a free society opposed to that of a slave nation.

Such continuing comparisons are not wise to make, for are we talking in terms of 5 or 50 years? What criteria do we use, what yardsticks, for example, to determine progress in a country from which information is extremely difficult to obtain? Unpredictable floods, famines, and other disasters can have a profound effect. We had best abandon these scales as potentially dangerous, as not being necessarily meaningful, and as not in fact providing the various incentive factors their users ascribe to them.

Regardless of our approach, however, the struggle for influence within India will continue to intensify. The Americans, the Soviets, the Chinese, and to a degree the British all have stakes in this country of various similar or different types.

One can pause here to reflect that it does not seem likely that any full-scale invasion of India by Red China will take place within the next decade. Too many resources in terms of men and materiel would have to be committed, entry into India is logistically very difficult, such aggression would be severely questioned or criticized by those nations it seeks most to influence, and the returns in India itself except in terms of territorial gain would be questionable. Finally, China would have to reckon on substantial material support for India from both the United States and United Kingdom.

The strategy involved in trying to keep India off balance through threats, occasional border raids, and an erosion of the northern frontiers would seem to be much more profitable for the time being.

THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM

In these circumstances, the United States must determine what steps it will take and decide at the outset that it should not take them alone, but jointly with Great Britain. The U.K. still plays a major role in South Asia. Her influence was demonstrated during the Rann of Kutch dispute in the spring of 1965 when she was able to act successfully as mediator in bringing India and Pakistan to agreement on a peaceful settlement of what could have led to a major war. Second, both the U.S. and U.K. should agree

that the continued integrity of India from Communist domination is vital to our common interests. We cannot abandon almost half a billion people to communism, nor can we afford the loss of territory which would open all of southeast Asia and western Asia as far as the Mediterranean to the control of a hostile power, nor can we afford to lose the resources of this area to any Communist state. Third, we--the United States and Great Britain--must let it be known that we consider the integrity of India vital to our interests and let Peking and Moscow draw their own conclusions. We would displease many Indians, who still want India to be not only politically, but also militarily neutral, men such as Dr. Raj. Krishna, Vice President of the Institute of Political and Social Studies in Calcutta, who wrote recently: "The advantage of the present non-alignment policy is simply that it facilitates a build-up of our conventional forces with aid from many quarters."⁶ He was, of course, referring to Soviet military help, as well as to ours and that of the British.

THE SOVIET UNION

Soviet influence in India is potentially a greater threat than the Chinese. Apart from military equipment

⁶Dr. Raj. Krishna, "India and the Bomb," Military Review, Dec. 1965, p. 75.

made available to all three of India's armed services, Soviet economic assistance has been of significant size, including the provision of a steel mill. Important, too, is the fact that Soviet policy has favored India's claim to Kashmir, rather than Pakistan's.⁷

We can recall that colonialism and racial discrimination in other British dominions led Nehru to write of the pre-World War II era that "Indian opinion inevitably sides with Soviet Russia and the Eastern Nations."⁸ Another later view is that

The possibility that one day India might have to fall back on the Kremlin's veto in the Security Council, or its nine votes in the General Assembly, goes far to explain Nehru's policy of neutrality in the Cold War.⁹

India was pleased when Premier Khrushchev in December 1955 said that the U.S.S.R. sympathized with Afghan policy against Pakistan in the Pushtoonistan dispute. (But India was mightily displeased with Pakistan's decisions to join the Southeast Asia and Central Treaty Organizations and with subsequent American arms aid to her enemy.) The Soviets thus have many friends in India, even outside the Indian Communist Party.

⁷Lest we become too alarmed, it should be noted that 97% of India's trade is with the free world; only 1% with Communist China. (From India's China Policy, M.C.I. Feer, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1954.)

⁸Nehru, op. cit., p. 423.

⁹William R. Frye, A U.N. Peace Force, pp. 36-37.

- As with the Chinese, however, it is very doubtful that the U.S.S.R. will launch an attack against India as a primary target within the foreseeable future. Primary Soviet concern with the subcontinent is for the moment at least to keep a watchful eye on Chinese activities and influence in South Asia and to continue to try to strengthen and orient the Indian Communist Party toward Moscow. Subversion and the destruction of western capabilities remain important, but it is interesting to speculate that Soviet eagerness to arrange a reconciliation of the differences between India and Pakistan, which resulted in the Tashkent meeting, might well be laid to a deep concern that a result of a continuing war could mean further and more permanent Chinese involvement in the subcontinent, that if the war went on China might supply military aid in some quantity to Pakistan and at the same time renew attacks on Indian border installations.

As for the United States, we can tolerate a Soviet take-over of India no more than a Chinese, but as mentioned above no military aggression seems probable now. Only in the event of a general war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. would it presently appear that the Soviets would try to move south into Pakistan and India.

Again our policy and actions must be concerted with those of the British and be designed to make crystal clear to the world that this is a region of great importance to us.

More significantly for the immediate future and within the context of Soviet policy, we must be prepared to meet the Soviet economic and psychological attack. We have already made available to India more than five billion dollars in other than military aid and the end is far from in sight. What identities of interest we have with India in the bitter struggle with Peking and Moscow must be made apparent and must be accepted. We have not yet found the tools to accomplish this purpose.

CHAPTER 4

THE SECOND POWER--PAKISTAN

RELATIONS WITH INDIA


India is the key to the success of western policy in South Asia and our disappointment with Pakistan's political performance and our concern with the results should never be allowed to temper the importance of this fact.

The fear of Indian aggression has been over the years the most crucial determinant in the formulation of Pakistan's foreign policy. . . . Pakistan's entry into the military pacts (CENTO and SEATO) could thus be interpreted as an attempt on her part to counteract, withstand, and, if possible, neutralize the two pressures from Kabul and New Delhi.¹

Pakistan's motivation for joining in what are essentially western-sponsored pacts is well summed up in this quotation. India is an obsession with Pakistan. Communalism, Kashmir, and the waters of the Indus Basin have combined over the years to create a feeling of true hatred, but more important, true fear of her larger and more powerful neighbor. India's army alone is $3\frac{1}{2}$ times the size of Pakistan's.² Indian's resources of manpower and materiel, although in many respects not as efficiently or

¹Sharif Al-Muhajid, Chairman, Journalism Department, Karachi University.

²Time, Sep. 17, 1965, p. 44.



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effectively organized as Pakistan's, far outnumber and outweigh those of her enemy. The roots of conflict were described in Chapter 1, but a critical factor of the physical division of Pakistan into two wings separated by a thousand miles of India was not. Whether in fact this truncated political state should ever have been permitted existence need not be debated, for it is a reality of international and national life, and one which creates real and continuing problems.

INTERNAL PROBLEMS

Pakistan's national and divided life is a constant headache and source of trouble for the central government at Islamabad. The Bengali is contentious and resentful of authority, particularly foreign authority and he considers rule from West Pakistan as foreign. He believes he is being constantly cheated out of his fair share of the budgetary pie. He has a centuries-old tradition of grievance, discord, and resentment against all non-Bengalis. His territory cannot be defended. (In 1201 all of Bengal was taken with a force of 16 men.)

Thus separatism is a constant worry, making the central government always receptive to such tales as hold the United States to be working covertly toward a "united Bengal" under India. Pakistan's preoccupation with India in this concern naturally counts heavily:

So vast is the net of subversion that it is beyond the capabilities of small nations to cut their way out of it. . . . East Pakistan is the main target of subversion. Its peculiar economic situation is fully exploited by the Indian agents.³

The Bengalis themselves have had prominent spokesmen for a separate political life. In 1954, for example, Fazlul Huq, the Chief Minister of Bengal and head of the Krishak Sramik Party, called for independence.⁴

East Pakistan's problems are many. Largely due to terrain, its defense "is extremely difficult to organize."⁵ It is surrounded on its western, northern, and most of its eastern borders by a hostile India. Overpopulation is another problem. Fifty-two million people are jammed into 55,000 square miles.⁶ At the time of partition, while most of the jute--its chief crop and foreign exchange earner--was being raised in East Bengal, all the jute mills were in West Bengal, largely in and around Calcutta. It has no industrial base whatsoever.⁷

But separatism lies at the heart of its troubles. The Bengali thinks of himself as Asian. The Punjabi, particularly the educated one, thinks of himself as

³Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security, p. 150.

⁴Richard V. Weekes, Pakistan: Birth and Growth of a Muslim Nation, p. 106.

⁵Siddiqi, op. cit., p. 136.

⁶Statesman's Year Book, 1964-1965.

⁷Weekes, op. cit., p. 93.

Middle Eastern. In Parliament, Urdu and English are largely spoken, not Bengali. When civil disorders occur, Punjabi troops are sent to Dacca to restore peace. And the central government not only sits in West Pakistan, but is largely composed of West Pakistanis, although in total population they are outnumbered by the Bengalis in a six to four ratio.

Up to the present, East Pakistan has been vital to the economic structure of the country as a whole, at one time through the sale of jute generating more than 70 per cent of the country's foreign exchange. Huge new mills were built after partition. Nevertheless, as the agricultural and industrial complex of West Pakistan continues to grow, the political and military liabilities of East Pakistan may become too great for the government to bear, but such future developments are now much too speculative to postulate on.

Finally, the susceptibility of the Bengali to riot, discord, and intrigue makes him also susceptible to Communist and other subversion and thereby develops an ever-present danger with which we must also be concerned.

The Pakistan Government has not been free of troubles in the West, too. In recent years, difficulties with the Pathans over Pushtoonistan have only been exceeded by troubles caused by Baluchi tribes in opposition to central authority. The Pakistan Air Force, as well as the Army,

has been used to quell revolts, using, incidentally, American-provided equipment.

FOREIGN POLICY

Turning to Pakistan's external relations, as with India, the United States' ability to exert influence is very limited and Pakistan remains chiefly concerned with its immediate neighbors.

Essentially, it has considered itself surrounded by four hostile powers: Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and India. Of these, it has been actively engaged against the first and last. (It should be noted that Afghanistan was the only country to vote against the admission of Pakistan into the United Nations.)

As early as 1946, Afghanistan was calling for an independent Pushtoonistan for the 11 million Pathans who live on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border, the new nation, however, to be comprised wholly of Pakistani territory. Such pressure continued, aided in various ways by India, and resulted in Pathan uprisings which in turn led to a rupture in diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in 1955. After various and stormy attempts at mediation by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, a reconciliation and another break, relations were reestablished and Ambassadors exchanged in 1957. (Here we can remember Khrushchev's expression of sympathy for

the Afghan cause and that the Pakistanis have not forgotten it.)

The willingness of Pakistan to come to an agreement on settlement, despite the intensity of its frictions with Afghanistan, can be attributed directly to the fact that it has always recognized India as the most dangerous enemy. It had no desire to face two active, hostile states on essentially three fronts: Bengal, the Punjab and Sind, and the Afghans along the Durand Line.

THE U.S.S.R. AND RED CHINA

With the same consideration in mind, Pakistan has made efforts to avoid any antagonism between itself and Red China and the Soviet Union. Relations with the U.S.S.R. over the past few years have been correct, often studiously so, in view of Soviet support of the Afghan position⁸ and the Pakistani awareness of the Soviets' interest in extending its territory south "in the direction of the Indian Ocean," declared in its negotiations with Nazi Germany in 1939.

⁸ Although in early 1960, President Ayub was moved to say about Soviet support of Afghanistan: "To us the object is quite clear. It is first of all to aggravate problems in this part of the world and secondly pave the way for the age-old attempt of the North to dominate the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and the areas surrounding it." (Quoted in Pakistan Seeks Security, p. 32.)

Relations with China have been warmer. A few years ago Pakistan reached a border settlement, conceding territory. In 1963, she concluded a trade agreement, later an air transport agreement, and then accepted a \$60 million interest-free loan. Very recently, aircraft and ground equipment acquired from Peking were on display in Rawalpindi. When, in 1962, Chinese troops moved over India's northern border, Pakistan could not help but cheer.

THE UNITED STATES

As she has drawn closer to the Chinese, she has turned increasingly away from the United States and the West. When, in answer to the Chinese incursion, the U.S. began giving India military equipment, the Pakistanis became vicious in their denunciation of America as betraying a friend, and the long, downhill slide in U.S.-Pakistan relations was under way. It was accelerated by a feeling in the Pakistan government that neutralism was becoming more and more fashionable, even in America, by a desire to create more normal relations with the Communist powers, by anti-western officials of Cabinet membership, by a growing conviction that United States' support for Pakistan's position on Kashmir was weakening, by President Johnson's abrupt postponement of President Ayub's scheduled visit to Washington in May 1965, and by the American decision made unilaterally to postpone the Pakistan aid consortium meeting scheduled for July.

Nonetheless, Pakistan has continued her membership in SEATO and CENTO,⁹ the United States kept fulfilling her commitment to supply military aid until the war broke out with India in August 1965, and has now resumed economic aid. On the other side, while the results of Ayub's talks with President Johnson in mid-December have not become visible to the public, American pique at Pakistan's relations with China and her lack of support for American policy and action in Vietnam still rankle and prevent the resumption of anything approaching the relations which existed in the early 1950's.

ECONOMIC PROGRESS

In considering our posture toward Pakistan, there is an important, additional element. This is the effort that country has made in the field of economic development. With the help of some \$3 billion of American assistance, the Pakistanis have made remarkable progress. It is a rare country in the underdeveloped world where agricultural production is exceeding population in growth rate. Exports are rising more rapidly in rate than the gross national product. Investment is at more than 18 per cent of the national income.¹⁰ In short, the government's economic

⁹She justifies this by citing the economic benefits she gains through membership and ignores the military implications.

¹⁰Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan - The Development Miracle, pp. 4-5.

policy, while harsh in some respects, is paying off handsomely and is one of the best examples of the effective use of American economic aid around the world.

CHAPTER 5

SOUTH ASIA FROM THE OUTSIDE

THE EXTERNAL THREAT

While war between India and Pakistan with no other implications would be grim enough and important enough for us to take whatever measures without direct military intervention necessary to bring it to a close, the proximity of the Soviet Union and Communist China to South Asia makes internal conflict on the subcontinent much more dangerous. We cannot discard the possibility that in the long haul Soviet territorial aspirations still stretch to the Indian Ocean and certainly a Moscow-directed Communist government in India would be about as great a tour de force as the Soviets could hope for in Asia and would create a desperate situation for western policy. By almost the same token, Chinese policy to dominate Asia, if successful, would make for the United States and its allies a strategic complexity of hideous difficulty.

In the absence of a general war--begun in Europe, the Far East, or against American territory--it is hard to visualize any external, physical attempt to take the subcontinent by force. It is much more likely that both the U.S.S.R. and China will continue to concentrate on subversion, on attempts to establish communities of common interest, and on other traditional measures, such as aid

in the form of loans, outright grants, equipment, and the provision of technicians.

The prospects for successful subversion resulting in the establishment of a Communist or Communist-controlled government, say by a Moscow or Peking-directed legislature, seem dim in the case of Pakistan, although East Bengal is an increasingly dangerous area. What is anti-Western and pro-Red Chinese about many high-ranking government officials can be attributed to the factors listed in Chapter 4--most are probably more anti-Western than pro-Chinese. So long as the economy continues healthy, despite the smuggling up to Peking, it appears doubtful that the constitutional process could bring a Communist government into power, at least within the next 10 years.

India is considerably more volatile and uncertain. As this is written, food riots are going on in the state of Kerala, where Communist strength is strongest. Indira Gandhi's investiture in January as Prime Minister brings little comfort to those who look for strong leadership in India. The Soviet Union automatically has become a strong friend of India, as a result of the ideological war with Communist China. Yet Indians consider themselves Asian, and China, not Russia, to them is Asian. Thus, there is going to be a continuing power struggle in India between the two great powers to the north with the Soviet Union presently far ahead in the race.

WESTERN INFLUENCE

The West stands in an uneasy position. Among the western nations, the best is held by Great Britain, whose quiet diplomacy and ability to exercise it, as noted above, were able to bring about an extraordinary settlement between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch dispute. (Former colonial powers, it can be added, do not always come out second best. Witness the United States since World War II in the Philippines and France in some of its former territories in West Africa.)

The United States does not hold a pre-emptive position in South Asia despite its massive economic and military aid programs, which probably total over \$12 billion combined to both countries. A reality is that independence means just that for both India and Pakistan. Neither will normally allow the reality of freedom to be threatened by outside influences. The exception could most probably be due to what aid they separately or collectively might seek or accept to save that freedom when they considered it jeopardized.

India's need for help in 1962 is a good example. While the Soviet Union gave some military assistance, the United States and United Kingdom gave considerably more. Constancy and direction in effort is a characteristic of the West--and must continue to be so--which the expediency of the Communist powers cannot match over the years. So,

among many attributes, what we must have is infinite patience in dealing with South Asia and our motivations must be made entirely clear.

THE UNITED NATIONS

It is well for a moment to turn here to the United Nations, which has shown an ability to deal with the problems of the subcontinent with both wisdom and speed, although not always with complete effectiveness. This ability has been due to a large degree to the absence of Communist China from membership, the high status of the U.N. as an organization in South Asia, and the relative ineffectiveness of individual western nations in exerting individual influence on either India or Pakistan.

Suddenly, in August 1965 we found ourselves in the United Nations aligned with the Soviet Union in actively seeking means to bring the Kashmir war to an end. Our own objectives were obvious: to prevent another holocaust in the area, to prevent a wider conflict, and to avert the possibility of powers hostile to us from taking advantage of the situation to establish stronger positions in South Asia.

The Soviets appear to have been equally apprehensive about the last possibility and to have moved toward bringing the war to a close primarily for that reason. It may well have felt that Red China would step in, supporting

Pakistan, with more serious armed attacks and perhaps an invasion of India. This would have been intolerable to the U.S.S.R. and its later invitation to Ayub and Shastri to meet at Tashkent is a further indication of Soviet preoccupation with this problem. Without question, Soviet success in helping to bring the two nations to an agreement, particularly to a withdrawal of forces to the lines they previously held, was a major triumph and we should in no way believe that it was not.

U.S. POLICY AND SOUTH ASIA

It does not seem, however, that American relations with Indian and Pakistan have been adversely affected by Tashkent. Soviet prestige no doubt has been enhanced in various countries beyond South Asia, but the Russians cannot supply the grain to keep the subcontinent from starving, nor any other type of aid in the quantity needed to keep its economic development progressing at a rate commensurate with both economic and internal political requirements. In mid-December, President Ayub went on his postponed visit to Washington and while the more important substance of the talks with President Johnson has not been made public, it seems probable from the White House press release that at the least they were frank and that each country's views were fully put forward and discussed.

It is not in the nature of things, however, that either Pakistan or India (whose Indira Gandhi has also and more recently visited Washington) can or will support, for instance, American policy in Vietnam. The appearance of a third world is very real. The fear of a third world war is also very real within that world and what seems to it as an uncertain outcome is likely to continue, keeping both India and Pakistan on their present track in their relations with us. The election of Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister of India is not likely to bring about any basic change in Indian outlook. (Indeed, more likely is a weakening of India's political direction and a fragmentation of authority, which should seem to both the Communist Chinese and the Soviets to offer further opportunities for exploitation and infiltration.)

WEAKNESS IN THE SUBCONTINENT

While both Red China and the U.S.S.R. represent the most direct threats to South Asia from without, India and Pakistan represent not only a continuing peril to each other, but also are subject to harrassment from elsewhere. Afghanistan, for example, can at any time take advantage of Pakistan's weakness to attempt the Pushtoonistan ploy once more. India has troubles with Nepal, Burma, and Ceylon. The Nepalese regime is resentful of India's continuing and historical interest in Nepal as a buffer

against the north. The Burmese want their Indian population to go home and Ceylon feels the same way about its Tamil tea estate workers.

In every way, life is desperately harsh on the subcontinent of Asia. Disease, hunger, and grinding poverty affect most of its people. There are always economic dislocations, plague, cyclones, floods, earthquakes, and famine to contend with. There is blinding religious, social, and linguistic hostility; there is armed confrontation; there is a grave lack of responsible political loyalty to the center; there is a surfeit of irresponsible political leadership; and there is the continuing external enmity from all sides. The mere struggle to remain alive leaves most vestiges of tolerance far behind.

Yet South Asia remains an area of major importance in the East-West conflict and despite its own avowed refusal to be a part of this conflict, it inevitably has become one.

CHAPTER 6

THE YEARS AHEAD

Already summarized are various conclusions regarding the American stance toward South Asia, such as the necessity to make common cause with the British whenever possible, but some others remain.

AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY

A new policy with respect to military aid and action is essential and should be derived from the lessons learned in August and September 1965, from an assumption that neither India or Pakistan could alone or together, if this were ever possible, withstand massive Soviet or Chinese attack, and from the fact that South Asia is an area vital to our national interest.

The United States should be prepared to deny with its own forces access to the subcontinent by either the Red Chinese or Soviets in any aggressive movement.

We should recognize the impossibility of either country not using American-provided arms against each other in the event fighting resumes. As neither India nor Pakistan can by themselves save South Asia from the north regardless of the types or quantities of foreign arms assistance, but recognizing the value of their security forces in maintaining internal order and combatting

subversion, we should be prepared to provide more weapons of a riot-control nature, small arms, communications equipment, and transport. On an emergency basis, when the internal security of either country is threatened, we should further provide arms of suitable types.

The stabilizing influence of the security forces of India and Pakistan should lead to the extent possible to the training of their officers in the United States and in the United Kingdom. To this end also, our MAAG should be retained in Pakistan, together with the U.S. armed forces staff required in India for training in the use of American-supplied military equipment. We should not deny spare parts for materiel already given, even though it may be for tanks and aircraft, for the political loss would be greater than the gain of our military objective.

We cannot prevent the acquisition of military help from other sources, such as the Soviet Union is giving India, for instance, but a more modest program on our part should still prevent real dependence on the part of either India or Pakistan on Communist powers to rebuild the strength of their armed forces.

AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY

In the economic field, we must concentrate on persuading the two countries to take all-out measures in the field of population control and make available to them

what material resources are required and which they cannot afford. These would include, for example, audio-visual units for educational purposes, technicians, and funds for clinics. We must persuade India to revamp her agricultural development program, which is stagnated by crippling administrative practices, incompetent officials, poor planning, and perhaps most important by the lack of an effective organization on what we would call the Department of Agriculture County Agent level.

We should, giving India a reasonable amount of time to accomplish the objective, make future food shipments under P.L. 480 contingent on this major shake-up. There is no internal problem which is presently more important to the stability and prosperity of South Asia than finding means of increasing food production.

Concurrently, and again with particular reference to India, a sizeable portion of our aid should go into creating better facilities for food distribution. It does little good to put a million tons of wheat into Bombay, if the port cannot get it unloaded before the maggots take over, if trucks and railroad trains cannot handle it in sufficient quantity, and finally if it cannot be moved in time into the villages, the ultimate consumers.

These are the essential parts of what our aid programs should be. There is little gain in the U.S. expending resources available to the subcontinent in other fields

until we have addressed ourselves fully to the central problems of population and agriculture. For the time being, the rest is window-dressing.

AMERICAN POLITICAL POLICY

There is much written in earlier chapters about political factors, both domestic and external, but a few more words are necessary.

The United States should continue to recognize the importance of the United Nations in keeping peace in South Asia, but on a bilateral basis we should keep our interest and concern before both countries.

We should discount our thoughts--if any still exist--that Pakistan will make a commitment of a military nature in any type of emergency in which we might be inclined to try to invoke participation under SEATO provisions or other countries under CENTO provisions. Nor should we be unduly bothered by this. The benefit of Pakistan's membership was almost wholly political: the fact of a newly-independent, formerly a colony, a Moslem country willing to align itself with western powers in essentially anti-Communist organizations.


What identities of interest we have with both India and Pakistan should be made constantly and consistently apparent.

We want in the subcontinent those elements of social and economic progress which we desire in all the emerging nations of the free world. We want them free of subversion, non-Communist, and increasingly willing and desirous of aligning themselves with us on major issues of foreign policy. We want them secure from foreign aggression.

We would like to see the antagonisms and tensions between them dissipated and eventually eliminated completely.

We do not want either a continuation of Chinese Communist border threats against India or a continuation of Sino-Pakistani togetherness.

We know what we want in South Asia, but we should continually remind ourselves that we alone have limited leverage in realizing our objectives. Despite this limitation, there are courses open to us, some of which the United States is already on and some which she can, with not an excessive amount of additional effort and with no basic change in policy direction, adopt to bring about a significantly favorable change in her relationships on the subcontinent of Asia.


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